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 2 
On Friday October 16, 1981, President Ronald Reagan wrote in his personal 
diary, “Central America is really the world’s next hotspot. Nicaragua is an armed camp 
supplied by Cuba and threatening a communist takeover of all of Central America.”1 For 
the next eight years as Commander-in-Chief, this mindset would shape his perspective on 
the small Third World country about the size of North Carolina. The Administration’s 
policies, actions, and attitudes toward Nicaragua and other perceived hostile nations 
became known as “Reagan Doctrine.” The defeat of the Nicaraguan Revolution became 
the “cornerstone of the Reagan Central American policy and the test case of Reagan 
Doctrine.”2
Reagan Doctrine was not a label coined by President Reagan or his 
administration. It was a term used later by his critics to define his foreign policy strategy 
for countries around the world. The Reagan Doctrine was a strategy to aid anti-
communist, or more specifically, anti-Soviet insurgencies in the Third World during 
Reagan’s two terms as president from 1981-1989. The primary goal was to overthrow 
Marxist regimes and/or prevent Marxist regimes from becoming established.  
 This paper offers an analysis and critique of the effectiveness of Reagan 
Doctrine in Nicaragua. 
Reagan wasted no time getting started in the implementation of his foreign policy. 
He supported insurgencies in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua soon after 
his election in 1981.3
                                               
1 Ronald Reagan, The Reagan Diaries, ed. Douglas Brinkley (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 
44. 
 The Administration’s first comprehensive “U.S. National Security 
Strategy,” which was a document approved by the President in May of 1982, stated the 
2 William I. Robinson, A Faustian Bargain: U.S. Intervention in the Nicaraguan Elections and 
American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder, Co: Westview Press Inc., 1992), 12. 
3 Though the topic of this paper is the case study of Nicaragua under Reagan Doctrine, it is 
important to note that while facilitating insurrections in Nicaragua, the administration was doing the same 
thing in other Third World countries. Reagan Doctrine was a global strategy. The support of the 
Mujaheddin in their war against USSR in Afghanistan  is another example of the Reagan Doctrine.  
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objective to “contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence 
throughout the world, and to increase the costs of Soviet support and use of proxy, 
terrorist and subversive forces.”4 Reagan made staunch calls for public support in his 
efforts. In the State of the Union Address in 1985, for example, he stated that the U.S. 
must “not break faith with those who are risking their lives—on every continent, from 
Afghanistan to Nicaragua—to defy Soviet-supported aggression.” One year later he 
boldly remarked that “America will support with moral and material assistance your right 
not just to fight and die for freedom, but to fight and win freedom…in Afghanistan, in 
Angola, in Cambodia, and in Nicaragua.”5
In most of these nations, the aggressive policies and actions of Reagan caused 
severe damage. In Nicaragua for example, the economy was decimated by U.S. sanctions 
and manipulation of its banking institutions. The Administration, supported by Congress, 
funded a war against the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de 
Liberación Nacional, or FSLN). It was a war fought by various Nicaraguan rebel groups, 
labeled the Contras, which sought to overthrow the Sandinistas, who came to power after 
the revolution in 1979.  
 
The development of Contra forces began in 1981 when Reagan authorized $19.5 
million in funding for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to construct a paramilitary 
force of 500 Nicaraguan exiles from deposed President Anastasio Somoza’s National 
Guard.6
                                               
4 Chester Pach, “The Reagan Doctrine: Principle, Pragmatism, and Policy,” Presidential Studies 
Quarterly 36.1 (2006): 80. 
 Along with congressionally funded aid, members of the Reagan Administration 
5 James M. Scott, “Interbranch Rivalry and the Reagan Doctrine in Nicaragua,” Political Science 
Quarterly 112, no. 2 (Summer 1997): 237. 
6 Kenneth Roberts, “Bullying and Bargaining: The United States, Nicaragua, and Conflict 
Resolution in Central America,” International Security 15, no. 2 (Autumn  1990): 78. 
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attained additional funds through the illicit sales of arms to Iran. Funds from these sales 
were funneled to the Contras. When this illegal activity was revealed in the “Iran-Contra 
Affair” in November of 1986, it led to the indictment and conviction of many of 
Reagan’s staff.  
The results of continual U.S. aggression in the 1980s were major factors that led 
to the ultimate fall of the FSLN. The Sandinista collapse was not due to a Contra military 
victory, however, but was essentially due to the economic impact of U.S. sanctions, the 
trade embargo, and Contra attacks on the social and economic infrastructure of the 
country. The failing economy was the determining factor that finally pushed President 
Daniel Ortega to accept his defeat in the elections of 1990 and turn over the government 
to the victorious conservative, Violeta Chamorro. These elections were not due to 
Reagan’s efforts however, but rather to others, particularly President Oscar Arias of 
Costa Rica. It was he who facilitated and negotiated the peaceful transfer of power in 
Nicaragua.7
Reagan policy in Nicaragua was failure in many respects. The Contra war was ill-
conceived and did not enjoy support of the people of Nicaragua. The rebel forces never 
legitimately threatened the Sandinista government and military. The U.S. failed to gain 
international support for the war or its political and economic actions. In fact, Reagan 
 Reagan’s aggressive foreign policy did not lead to the ceasefire in 1988 nor 
the democratic elections and peace agreements of 1989-90.  
                                               
7 Sources that evaluate and discuss Arias’ peace plan and how it was developed and eventually 
adopted are well-documented in: Kenneth Roberts, “Bullying and Bargaining: The United States, 
Nicaragua, and Conflict Resolution in Central America,” International Security 15, no. 2 (Autumn  1990): 
67-102 and Linda Robinson, “Peace in Central America?,” Foreign Affairs 66, no. 3 (January 1988).  
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was largely condemned by the international community. Domestic support and popular 
opinion was low as well.8
Reagan complained in his diary in March of 1985 of the lack of support, writing: 
“Our communications on Nicaragua have been a failure, 90 percent of the people know 
it’s a communist country but almost as many don’t want us to give the Contras [money] 
for weapons.”
  
9 U.S. funding and support for the war effort was inadequate. The 
blemishes of the Iran-Contra Affair and the failure of the Contra mission to overthrow the 
government scarred Reagan’s remaining years as President. As the war continued on, 
Reagan lost more and more support in Congress for his efforts in Nicaragua, and it 
eventually led to his decreased role in bringing peace to the country, especially after the 
Republican Party loss of a Senate majority in 1986.10
Nicaragua did not pose a threat to the U.S., and the Soviet Union and Cuba did 
not try to dominate Ortega and his government, even though they provided aid to the 
Sandinistas as a result of the U.S. economic embargo. Reagan was convinced that 
Nicaragua was “of course” another Cuba.
  
11
                                               
8 Joshua Muravchik, “The Nicaragua Debate,” Foreign Affairs 65, no. 2 (December 1986): 371.  
 Reagan’s policies pushed communist nations 
into aiding Nicaragua. The FSLN enjoyed majority support of the people, and were not 
looking for a change until the end of the decade when they could no longer survive with 
the Sandinistas under U.S. pressure. Did Reagan really need to be concerned with 
Nicaragua? Probably not. However, his firm Cold War policy stance led him to believe 
For example, in 1986, a CBS/New York Times poll revealed that there was more than a 2-1 
majority that U.S. citizens opposed funding the Contras. 
9 Reagan, “Reagan Diaries,” 308, 402. 
10 Roberts, 94. 
11 Reagan, “Reagan Diaries,” 67. 
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that the country posed a threat, and he had to do whatever it took to keep socialism out of 
Central America by making Nicaragua “say uncle.”12
In damaging Nicaragua’s economy, Reagan Doctrine policy caused ripple effects 
on the USSR and Cuba who were aiding Nicaragua during this time. When the 
Administration began to halt trade and relations with Nicaragua, the USSR and Cuba 
began their efforts to provide the country increased economic aid, military aid, and trade 
revenue. By the time Reagan left office, economic aid from the USSR never came close 
to covering Nicaragua’s losses from U.S. sanctions on the economy. The USSR was not 
prepared to shoulder the financial burden of propping the Nicaraguan economy.
 
13
Many historians, political scientists, and economists have analyzed the 
complicated issue of Reagan Doctrine and its stress on Nicaragua that lasted almost a 
decade. It has been nearly twenty years since the Sandinistas were ousted from power, 
and evaluation of what led to their demise has been the subject of research and debate. 
 When 
the Sandinistas lost the elections of 1990, the USSR cut off its aid to Nicaragua. In 1991 
the USSR collapsed largely due to its own failing economy. Was it Reagan’s goal to 
financially strap the USSR through pressure on Nicaragua and other similar Soviet allies? 
It is likely, and if it was his goal, it worked. 
14
                                               
12 Bruce W. Jentleson, “The Reagan Administration and Coercive Diplomacy: Restraining More 
Than Remaking Governments,” Political Science Quarterly 106, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 66. 
  
Many scholars have come to the similar conclusion that the Reagan Administration 
mishandled Nicaragua in most respects, especially militarily and diplomatically. 
13 William M. Leogrande, “Making the Economy Scream: US Economic Sanctions against 
Sandinista Nicaragua,” Third World Quarterly 17, no. 2 (1996): 342-43. 
14 However former President, Daniel Ortega, was re-elected as President in 2006, representing the 
FSLN once more. 
 7 
The historiographal approach to the topic has been predominantly quantative, 
especially when historians discuss the economic impact the U.S. had on Nicaragua. The 
statistical and numerical data they provide is extensive. Much of the data comes from the 
government of Nicaragua: the Secretariat of Planning and the Budget and the Fondo 
Internacional de Reconstruccion, Managua. The statistics provided show numerical data 
representing such things as the impact of the damage of the balance of payments, the 
effect of the production losses on exports and domestic supply, and fiscal debt and 
inflation.15
William M. Leogrande’s journal article “Making the Economy Scream: US 
Economic Sanctions Against Sandinista Nicaragua”, published in 1996, looks at the 
economic stranglehold the U.S. placed on the Sandinista government in Nicaragua from 
1981-1990. Leogrande is an expert on Latin American affairs, and has frequently 
published works on the relationships between the U.S. and Latin American countries. 
Unlike analyses published by political scientists and historians during the 1980s, or 
shortly after the FSLN fell, this work discusses what happened almost a decade after the 
Sandinista government disintegrated.
 
16
                                               
15 E. V. K. Fitzgerald, An Evaluation of Economic Costs to Nicaragua of U.S. Aggression: 1980-
1984, in The Political Economy of Revolutionary Nicaragua, ed. Rose J. Spalding (Winchester, 
Massachusetts: Allen & Unwin, Inc., 1987), 200-02. 
 It provides a clearer picture of what happened 
after all the “dust had settled.” The key players of the era were either dead or gone, the 
FSLN had been defeated in elections and replaced, and the impact of the economic 
sanctions can be analyzed. Leogrande’s thesis is Reagan decimated the Nicaraguan 
16 Great sources of evaluating the economic impact of U.S.-led sanctions during the first term of 
Reagan’s Administration: William I. Robinson, A Faustian Bargain: U.S. Intervention in the Nicaraguan 
Elections and American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder, Co: Westview Press Inc., 
1992) and Bradford E. Burns, At War in Nicaragua: The Reagan Doctrine and the Politics of Nostalgia 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1987) 29-35. 
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economy and sanctions and the trade embargo were the most effective tools the 
administration used to destabilize the Nicaraguan government. 
This article is useful to compare with E.V.K. Fitzgerald’s chapter in The Political 
Economy of Revolutionary Nicaragua.17 Both Fitzgerald and Leogrande examine the 
economic effects resulting from the relationship between the two nations. Each historian 
views the issues during different time periods. “What if” statistics, which are projected 
outcomes of continual anticipated U.S. sanctions, portrayed by Fitzgerald, can be 
examined and analyzed to a degree in Leogrande’s work. Like Fitzgerald, Leogrande also 
uses a quantative approach by using numbers, statistics, and studies to make his 
arguments against the U.S. For example, Fitzgerald displays a table within the text that 
projects that annual growth in Nicaragua will continue to suffer and decline under U.S. 
sanctions through the rest of the 1980s.18 Her concerns in 1984 about Nicaragua’s future 
under U.S. sanctions are confirmed by Leogrande’s contemporary work that reflects on 
the rest of the decade. Leogrande states that by 1988, Nicaragua was in a severe 
recession, the economy contracted by 15 percent, and inflation was steadily increasing.19
From separate eras, Leogrande and Fitzgerald similarly argue that economic 
sanctions by the Reagan Administration were essential in bringing down the Sandinistas. 
Reagan’s actions during his presidency were viewed negatively by his contemporaries, 
and the analysis of his actions post-1990 reflects those early felt sentiments. They 
conclude that economic action taken by the U.S. ultimately led to the fall of the 
Sandinistas. It can then be argued, like many historians do, that Reagan’s military actions 
against the Sandinistas ultimately were unsuccessful in his hope to break the socialist 
 
                                               
17 Fitzgerald, 195-213. 
18 Ibid., 211. 
19 Leogrande, 343. 
 9 
government while his economic policies severely damaged the country. While Reagan 
essentially succeeded in bringing down the Sandinistas and draining Soviet and Cuban 
resources, his military campaign failed to bring the Sandinistas down, and the collateral 
damage caused by the Contras was significant. 
 The Contra war was intended to be fought against the military and military 
installations of the FSLN. Congress approved funding on several occasions throughout 
Reagan’s two terms because Reagan assured legislators in Washington that the Contras 
would be fighting the military exclusively.20 Congress was hesitant to support the 
insurgency, but voted for funding anyway. Reagan was emphatic that the U.S. would not 
be supplying its own troops, hoping to alleviate fears of “another Vietnam.”21
The U.S. played a significant role in these sabotage campaigns, but tried to paint 
the picture that it was entirely the Contra’s doing, keeping connections with the U.S. out 
of the conversation as much as possible.
 However, 
the Contras instead resorted to attacking the people of Nicaragua. Testimony of U.S. 
special forces confirm the focus of attacks was primarily economic targets, such as oil 
fields, coffee fields, and even the planting of mines in port cities.  
22 E. Bradford Burns, for example, concurs with 
the notion of the role of the U.S., making it a primary argument in his book.23
                                               
20 Useful sources on developing and implementation of U.S. foreign policy towards Nicaragua, as 
well as the actions of the Executive and Legislative branches include: William I. Robinson, A Faustian 
Bargain: U.S. Intervention in the Nicaraguan Elections and American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War 
Era (Boulder, Co: Westview Press Inc., 1992), Chester Pach, “The Reagan Doctrine: Principle, 
Pragmatism, and Policy,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 36.1 (2006), James M. Scott, “Interbranch Rivalry 
and the Reagan Doctrine in Nicaragua,” Political Science Quarterly 112, no. 2 (Summer 1997) and Philip 
Brenner, and William M.  Leogrande, “The House Divided: Ideological Polarization over Aid to the 
Nicaraguan ‘Contras’,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 18, no. 1 (February 1993). 
 The 
analysis of the Contra war is very condemning of the Reagan Administration. In fact, it is 
21 Reagan, “Reagan Diaries,” 308. 
22 Leogrande, 340. 
23 Bradford E. Burns, At War in Nicaragua: The Reagan Doctrine and the Politics of Nostalgia 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1987). 
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even suggested that many actions that the CIA and the Contras were engaging in could be 
defined as acts of terrorism.24
Scholars concur that Reagan’s war to bring down the FSLN was both illegal and 
ineffective. The Contras were unsuccessful and were not fighting a war that had been 
outlined by the Administration and Congress. Historians focusing on the relationship 
between the U.S. and Nicaragua during the 1980s offer different perspectives on what 
occurred, who was responsible, and what the final results were. Some scholars focus on 
the lack of military success, others on foreign policy formulation and implementation, 
and others evaluate the conflict through the problems the Administration faced by failing 
to get significant international support.
 Historians agree that the Contras were militarily weak and 
posed limited threat to the government and Sandinista military. The Contras were 
successful however, in launching a campaign against domestic targets that helped to 
bankrupt the national economy. 
25
There are several reasons why Reagan Doctrine policy in Nicaragua was 
unsuccessful and why U.S. intervention in the country was needless. When evidence is 
analyzed it becomes quite clear that the Reagan Administration acted harshly with the 
small, underdeveloped, weak Third World country during his two terms as President.
  
26
                                               
24 Burns, 152. 
 
25 Sources to analyze the lack of international support include: Bradford E. Burns, At War in 
Nicaragua: The Reagan Doctrine and the Politics of Nostalgia (New York: Harper & Row, 1987) and 
Kenneth Roberts, “Bullying and Bargaining: The United States, Nicaragua, and Conflict Resolution in 
Central America,” International Security 15, no. 2 (Autumn  1990). Valuable sources for evaluating the 
lack of Contra success against the Sandinista military: Leslie Cockburn, Out of Control: The Story of the 
Reagan Administration’s Secret War in Nicaragua (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1987), Bruce 
W. Jentleson, “The Reagan Administration and Coercive Diplomacy: Restraining More Than Remaking 
Governments,” Political Science Quarterly 106, no. 1 (Spring 1991). 
26 Transcripts of speeches, essays, letters, and radio addresses are found in: Ronald Reagan, 
Reagan in His Own Hand: The Writings of Ronald Reagan That Reveal His Revolutionary Vision For 
America, ed. Kiron K. Skinner, Annelise Anderson, and Martin Anderson (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
Inc., 2001) and diary entry primary sources are found in: Ronald Reagan, The Reagan Diaries, ed. Douglas 
Brinkley (New York: HarperCollins, 2007). 
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Nicaragua was not a threat to the national security of the U.S. The Sandinistas were not 
working with the USSR and Cuba to undermine the U.S. Reagan acted with a heavy 
hand, and the people of Nicaragua suffered tremendously because of his foreign policy. 
The Sandinistas improved the lives of the people as compared to Somoza’s reign, they 
held legitimate elections, and were willing to make concessions to the U.S. if Reagan was 
willing to negotiate. Reagan’s military campaign against the Sandinista forces was 
unsuccessful, and the revelations of CIA actions in Nicaragua and the Iran-Contra Affair 
all but eliminated international and domestic support for his foreign policy in Central 
America. 
Reagan worried that the Nicaraguan Revolution would start a “domino effect” in 
Latin American countries. He feared countries would eventually fall to communism.27 
The USSR and Cuba would infiltrate and utilize these countries to expand their influence 
over the globe and inch closer to the American border and establish a “beachhead.”28
Quite the opposite of being oppressive, the Sandinista revolution improved the lives 
of the people in several areas. After 1979, Nicaraguans enjoyed greater access to 
education, health care, and land. In 1980, a crash literacy campaign reduced illiteracy 
from 50 to 10 percent. By 1983, more than a million Nicaraguans (40 percent of the 
population) were in school and the number of schools doubled between 1979 and 1984. 
The government provided free education from kindergarten through graduate school. 
 He 
believed the Sandinistas were oppressive to their people and that the citizens desired 
democracy.  
                                               
27 The U.S., at this same time, was also heavily involved with the El Salvadoran and Guatemalan 
military. Insurgencies in both countries received some support from socialist nations. This further 
supported Reagan’s belief that the USSR and Cuba was trying to gain a foothold in Central America. 
28 Jentleson, 66. 
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Health care was also free. Agrarian reform targeted unused and underused land by 
handing it over to people who wanted it and were willing to work on it.29 These were all 
changes provided after the Somoza Dynasty was overthrown in 1979.30
Nicaragua had no intentions of becoming a client state of the USSR. Leaders of the 
FSLN actually downplayed the role of Marxism in the formulation of their party, and 
instead focused almost exclusively on the figure of Sandino (the founder of the FSLN 
decades before) and other Nicaraguan heroes who had been symbols of resistance to U.S. 
domination.
 
31 Though Nicaragua relied heavily on Soviet and Cuban aid through the 
1980s, it strove tremendously to erase the label as a Soviet client state in a desperate bid 
to gain support from West European governments as well as liberals in U.S. Congress.32
 Trying to erase the label that they were not a Soviet client state, early on the 
Sandinistas showed willingness to compromise with the U.S.  Following the U.S. 
invasion of Grenada in October 1983, Nicaraguan representatives made independent 
conciliatory moves to ease the pressure on their nation. Salvadoran rebel leaders and one 
thousand Cuban military advisors were asked to leave the country. Furthermore, the 
government offered to negotiate additional restrictions on foreign advisors, military 
forces and arms imports. The Contra rebels were offered partial amnesty. Despite 
Nicaragua’s willingness to negotiate, Reagan believed the best alternative was to 
continue his course of action. He wrote in his diary in the same month that “it’s amazing 
how much consensus there is…that what we are doing is right & Nicaragua is the real 
 
                                               
29 Burns, 6-7. 
30 The Somoza family had been in control of the Nicaraguan government since 1936. 
31 Gary Prevost, The FSLN, in Nicaragua Without Illusions: Regime Transition and Structural 
Adjustment in the 1990s, ed. Thomas W. Walker (Wilmington, De: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1997), 153. 
32 Prevost, 153. 
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villain.”33 Whereas the Sandinistas showed the willingness to cooperate and negotiate, 
Reagan believed in his original plans to overthrow the government through the Contra 
forces. He clearly was getting similar advice from the Administration to continue as 
planned in Nicaragua. Although Secretary of State George Shultz initially accepted the 
Sandinista initiatives, the Administration later dismissed Nicaragua’s moves as a 
“campaign of deception designed to avoid real accommodation.”34
Because Congress refused to appropriate as much money as desired by Reagan, the 
Administration turned to clandestine means such as acquiring funds from Saudi princes 
and various illegal and unconstitutional practices.
 
35 One of Reagan’s tactics named 
Operation Elephant Herd utilized the CIA and the Pentagon. Authorized by the President 
in June of 1982 and then implemented in December of the same year, the operation 
channeled military equipment secretly from the Pentagon’s inventory to the CIA for the 
Contras’ use. For example, in 1983 when Congress announced a legal cap of $24 million 
in aid to the Contras, Elephant Herd provided an additional $12 million worth of military 
supplies.36 Investigation exposed the CIA for its deplorable action in Nicaragua, such as 
the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, the preparation of an “assassination manual”, the 
military buildup in Honduras, and numerous other incidents, all which tarnished the 
American position in Nicaragua.37
One of Reagan’s principal arguments against the Sandinistas was that they were not a 
legitimate government because their elections in 1984 were “rigged.” The people of 
  
                                               
33 Reagan, “Reagan Diaries,” 189. 
34 Roberts, 78-9. 
35 Ibid., 70. Reagan wrote in his diary in December of 1981: “We’re proceeding with covert 
activity in Nicaragua to shut off supplies to the guerillas in El Salvador.” (Reagan, “Reagan Diaries,” 52.) 
36 Leslie Cockburn, Out of Control: The Story of the Reagan Administration’s Secret War in 
Nicaragua (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1987), 12. 
37 Jentleson, 70. 
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Nicaragua, according to Reagan, were being oppressed and viewed the government 
unfavorably. The Contras, to Reagan, represented freedom for Nicaraguans. He went as 
far as saying that the Contras were “the moral equal of our Founding Fathers.”38
 A primary reason President Ortega of Nicaragua wanted to hold elections was to 
meet his commitment to the people. He promised that as soon as “the conditions for 
national reconstruction might permit [elections]” the FSLN would create and 
institutionalize an authentic democracy in the framework of political pluralism and a 
mixed economy.
 
39
A delegation of fifteen professors from the Latin American Studies Association and a 
U.S. organization of over three thousand U.S. academic specialists on Latin America 
were observers during the 1984 elections. They reported favorably upon the November 
elections, concluding that they “observed no evidence of irregularities in the voting or 
vote-counting process.”
 Ortega and his government were following through on a promise to 
the citizens of Nicaragua. 
40 The FSLN won 67 percent of the vote, and the Reagan label of 
the election as a “Soviet-style sham” turned out to be false.41
World reaction to the U.S. trade embargo, beginning in May of 1985, was uniformly 
negative. U.S. allies including the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, and Portugal, all 
openly opposed the embargo and promised continued trading relationships with 
Nicaragua. Countries such as Canada, Italy, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden 
extended new trade credits to help offset the effects of the embargo.
 
42
                                               
38 Pach, 84. 
 Nicaragua largely 
succeeded in winning the moral “high ground” in the international community. 
39 Robinson, 30. 
40 Burns, 36-37. 
41 Robinson, 30-32. 
42 Leogrande, 339. 
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Washington found itself isolated as its policies were being increasingly condemned. The 
“Nicaraguan issue” became a headache for U.S. representatives wherever they turned in 
the world.43 The signing of the Arias Treaty in 1987 by Honduras and El Salvador, the 
closest Central American allies to the U.S., left the U.S. virtually alone in its support for 
the Contra war.44 Even public support for Reagan’s policy was low. An opinion poll 
showed that only 27.3 percent of Americans agreed with Contra aid.45 Reagan’s behavior 
toward Nicaragua, particularly in the glaring disregard for international law and world 
opinion, threatened to backfire and endanger broader U.S. interests, especially with 
foreign allies.46 At the United Nations in 1985, the Security Council voted 11-1 (with 3 
abstentions) for a resolution condemning the U.S. embargo. The U.S., however, used its 
veto. In General Assembly, a similar resolution was passed 84-4 (with 37 abstentions).47
Directed by Oliver North, the Administration secretly sold arms to Iran to obtain 
additional funding for the Contras. The U.S. had a trade embargo with Iran at the time, 
but Iran needed weapons for its war with Iraq. From August of 1985 until October of 
1986, the National Security Council secretly made six shipments of arms to Iran.
 
48
                                               
43 Robinson, 35. 
 These 
sales of arms also became a bargaining opportunity for the release of American hostages 
in Lebanon. Reagan was not only within range of impeachment for the secret sale of U.S. 
weapons to Iran in exchange for hostages, which violated not only the Arms Export 
Control Act and the National Security Act, but also violated his own stated policy against 
44 Roberts, 82. 
45 Jentlseon, 77. 
46 Robinson, 33. 
47 Leogrande, 339. 
48 Richard Sobel, “Contra Aid Fundamentals: Exploring the Intricacies and the Issues,” Political 
Science Quarterly 110, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 287.  
 16 
dealing with terrorists.49 North’s illegal use of proceeds to finance the rebels in Nicaragua 
had violated Congress’s constitutional authority over government appropriations, which 
were explicit in the Boland Amendments.50
Following the Iran-Contra Affair, Reagan’s influence over Nicaraguan policy 
gradually eroded, and the Democratic Congress supplanted him as the primary policy-
maker for Nicaragua, determining policy through the legislative process and control of 
the treasury.
 Nevertheless, Congress decided not to 
subject the American people to impeachment proceedings. 
51 The loss of GOP majority in the 100th Congress in 1986 helped accelerate 
Reagan’s decline in influence over policymaking. After 1986, the pro-Contra coalition in 
Congress was reduced, which allowed opponents in Washington to narrowly defeat 
Reagan’s requests for additional military assistance afterwards.52 He lamented in his 
personal diary of his struggles with Congress: “They support our Nicaragua peace 
proposals but won’t go for Contra aid which is only way to get Sandinistas to talk 
peace.”53
When Reagan’s congressional aid requests for the Contras are analyzed, it shows that 
Washington never fully supported his cause in Nicaragua, even when aid was granted. 
Only once, in 1985, was the Administration granted the full amount requested for aid. 
The President never got more than he had asked for, and in 1984 and 1988, Congress 
almost cut off all Contra aid.
   
54
                                               
49 Lawrence E. Walsh, Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, Inc., 1997), 3. 
 Even when Arias’ peace proposals stalled in the summer 
and fall of 1988, Reagan took the opportunity to ask for aid, but his requests fell on deaf 
50 Walsh, 13. The Boland Amendments were passed in 1982 and modified in 1984. 
51 Scott, 258. 
52 Philip Brenner, and William M.  Leogrande, “The House Divided: Ideological Polarization over 
Aid to the Nicaraguan ‘Contras’,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 18, no. 1 (February 1993): 122. 
53 Reagan, “Reagan Diaries,” 520-21.  
54 Jentleson, 78. 
 17 
ears. A majority of the U.S. government was by then committed to the peace process 
with, or without Reagan’s support.55
 Possibly even more influential than the loss of GOP control in Washington in 
1986 were the successful diplomatic peace talks taking place outside of the U.S. The 
Administration itself judged that the success of the diplomatic process had significantly 
weakened the pro-Contra aid coalition, so Reagan therefore delayed request for additional 
military aid until 1988, his final full year in office.
 
56
 The Iran-Contra Affair and the revelations of the CIA hurt not only Reagan’s 
reputation and legacy, but it essentially ended the chances for him to convince Congress 
to support his Nicaragua policy. While Reagan was waging his war with the Sandinistas, 
he ignored important facts: the FSLN was willing to compromise and make concessions 
to the U.S. Furthermore, the FSLN was not oppressing its people. In fact, according to the 
Defense Department, as stated in a leaked NSC strategy paper: “Support for democratic 
resistance within Nicaragua [did] not exist” and they had known this fact as early as 
1983.
 
57
Despite continued chronic guerrilla insurgency, the Contras achieved little military 
success, and were thus failing Reagan and his vision. The Sandinistas definitely had their 
vulnerabilities, but the Contras, CIA, and Reagan were not adept at targeting them.
  The government enjoyed support of the people and held a legitimate election in 
1984. Nicaragua was not a communist client state of the USSR, and had no desire to be.  
58
                                               
55 Scott, 256, 258. Congress instead kept the Contras alive through minimal humanitarian aid. 
 By 
1987-88, the possibility of a military solution to the war appeared increasingly unlikely, 
and the Nicaraguan government inflicted numerous military defeats on the Contra Army, 
56 Brenner and Leogrande, 127. 
57 Holly Sklar, Washington’s War on Nicaragua (Cambridge, Ma: South End Press, 1988), 145. 
58 Jentleson, 70. 
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forcing the bulk of rebel forces back to Honduras, where the Contras were largely based. 
Despite a brief rebel comeback, regional governments did not consider them to be a 
viable instrument for the disintegration of the Sandinista regime. In fact, the Contras 
never succeeded in capturing significant territory or population centers, nor were they 
successful in igniting any urban insurrectionary movements. Furthermore, military 
capability was hindered and undermined by internal political disarray within Contra 
leadership and the inconsistency of U.S. congressional support.59 A major step towards 
democracy in Nicaragua only occurred after Congress halted the flow and transfer of 
arms completely to the “freedom fighters” in 1988.60 The disintegration of congressional 
monetary aid was a failure of Reagan’s design for continuing the fight in the country.  
The Contras were simply an unreliable and ineffective military force.61
Due to his steadfast “bullying strategy” diplomacy and inept foreign policies 
toward the Sandinistas, Reagan ended up mishandling the situation altogether in 
Nicaragua. 
 
62
                                               
59 Roberts, 94. 
 The Contra military campaign against the socialist army was unsuccessful. 
The citizens of Nicaragua still preferred their government under Sandinista leadership. 
The government held legitimate elections in 1984 and Ortega was steadfast in assuring 
that Nicaragua would not become a Soviet client state. Reagan achieved nominal support 
outside the White House with his policies once the GOP lost control of Congress, and 
over time, his power and influence declined as the effects of the war and the exposure of 
the Iran-Contra Affair came to light. 
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As we have seen, Reagan Doctrine saw limited success in several arenas, and 
downright failure in others. But despite the Reagan Doctrine’s failures and miscues, 
Reagan and the Administration held on to the economic war, which was the only hope for 
success. Constant economic pressure throughout the 1980s proved to be very effective. 
Reagan’s most valuable weapon against the Sandinistas was attacking the government 
economically through sanctions and embargo, pressuring banking institutions against 
working with Nicaragua, and using the Contras to attack the economic infrastructure of 
the country.  
 Although Reagan did not publicly authorize the attacks against non-military 
targets, it is apparent that the CIA orchestrated and participated in operations against 
domestic targets. Reagan wanted to delegitimize the government by defeating it 
militarily, but his campaign was ineffective. In fact, in mid-1985 it became clear to the 
State Department that the Contras would be incapable of overthrowing the government.63
Reagan was much more assertive and aggressive with Nicaragua than his 
predecessor President Jimmy Carter, who initially accepted the Sandinista transition to 
power. Carter wanted to maintain a good relationship with the country. He was also less 
concerned with the USSR’s involvement or role in Sandinista Nicaragua. Carter 
perceived the Soviets as principled opportunists rather than the essential source of 
 
By the time he left office, economic sanctions were Reagan’s only effective foreign 
policy tool with Nicaragua. It was essentially the nation’s failing economy that pushed 
Ortega and the socialists out of power. 
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instability in the Third World.64 He adopted a policy of “cautious acceptance” of the 
Sandinistas and granted foreign aid up to $75 million to the country during the fiscal year 
of 1980.65 However, when he discovered the Sandinista government was using some of 
its allocated funds to support El Salvadoran rebels (which was later one of Reagan’s 
rationales for intervening in Nicaragua), Carter immediately suspended aid. As he left 
office, an already tense relationship with the country opened the door for Ronald Reagan 
to consider further and more assertive action. In fact, the “Reaganites’” electoral platform 
deplored the “Marxist Sandinista takeover Nicaragua,” and announced opposition to 
Carter’s aid program for the FSLN, or “assistance to any Marxist government in this 
hemisphere.”66
Following his inauguration, Reagan decided to withhold aid and halted shipments 
of wheat to Nicaragua.
 
67 Loans that Carter had suspended, Reagan officially 
terminated.68 This was not a surprise. In a radio address in March of 1979 before 
becoming president, Reagan believed the Nicaraguan rebels, who were trying to 
overthrow the Somoza Regime, were involved with communist nations.69
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 In his first 
speech on the economy as President, just sixteen days into his term, Reagan spoke of his 
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 21 
concerns in Nicaragua, saying that there was “Soviet-inspired trouble in the 
Caribbean…and leftist regimes have already taken over in Nicaragua.”70
For a short period of time, Reagan continued minimal financial support to the 
Sandinistas, hoping diplomatic pressure and threats to cut off economic assistance would 
succeed. Even though Sandinista shipments to El Salvador stopped, Reagan eventually 
decided to cut off Nicaraguan aid permanently. Within weeks, however, the USSR began 
to provide wheat and economic assistance to Nicaragua, and additional countries, 
including Cuba, joined to help aid the country. Fidel Castro’s government provided $64 
million in technical aid in 1981.
  
71
There was no concrete evidence connecting Nicaragua with communist nations 
that extended past economic relationships and military monetary aide. Reagan and his 
hardliners were impatient in their actions towards the Sandinistas, and though it appeared 
tough diplomacy and the threat of aid was originally successful, it did not coincide with 
Reagan’s vision of a “free” Nicaragua. A free Nicaragua could only become a reality, in 
Reagan’s mind, if the Sandinistas were ousted. However, it may have been Reagan’s plan 
to push the USSR and Cuba into draining resources into Nicaragua. The weaker those 
nations became, the more likely those communist nations would eventually fall, as the 
USSR certainly did at the end of the decade. 
 If Reagan’s “hard line” policy toward Nicaragua had 
not been taken, it is possible that socialist countries such as the USSR and Cuba would 
not have gotten financially involved in Nicaragua. Because of his aggression, Reagan 
forced the USSR and Cuba to supply considerable aid to Nicaragua. 
                                               
70 Reagan, “In His Own,” 485-6. 
71 Leogrande, 331. 
 22 
Beginning in 1981, the U.S. was moving towards a trade embargo against 
Nicaragua. In 1980, Nicaraguan conducted 30.4 percent of its trade with the U.S. but by 
1984, trade between the two nations had shrunk to 14.9 percent.72
The financial aggression towards Nicaragua was substantial. Not only did the 
United States ruin the Nicaraguan economy through financing a rebellion within the 
country, but it also effectively constricted the country by controlling and manipulating 
national and foreign banking institutions from providing assistance. Due to U.S. pressure 
on multilateral institutions (World Bank, IMF, IDB etc.) and private banks, Nicaragua 
had no access to “soft” loans (low interest rates and long repayment periods) to invest in 
infrastructure.
 By May 1985 a full 
embargo was in effect. It was internationally condemned by nations and its leaders who 
voted and called for the halting of the embargo. The U.S., however, utilized its veto 
powers and ignored outside protests, even from their staunchest of allies. The embargo 
was not lifted until the Sandinistas fell in 1990 when George H.W. Bush was President. 
73 Washington did whatever it could to keep money from flowing into 
Nicaragua. For example, the U.S. vetoed a $2.2 million IDB loan to finish a rural road 
project that had begun in 1976 and was over 90 percent completed. This angered many 
representatives from other countries.74 Secretary of State George P. Schulz warned the 
American Development Bank in 1985 that accepting a Nicaraguan agricultural credit loan 
request for $58 million risked the loss of U.S. financial support.75
Officials and Republican congressmen threatened banks from whom Nicaragua 
requested loans and they exercised veto power within the World Bank and Inter-
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American Development Bank against aid to the country. They filibustered in discussions 
of Nicaraguan policy, and bullied, threatened, and intimidated those who supported the 
country. By 1984, Nicaragua stopped repaying foreign debt to the U.S. because it was 
getting nothing in return in terms of new funds.76 International assistance was on steep 
decline, and the economy suffered tremendously. The U.S. government continued to 
pressure Western European nations to reduce foreign aid in Nicaragua, and to establish 
political conditions for any assistance.77 International economic support was almost 
exclusively burdened by the USSR and Cuba. Soviet aid to Nicaragua was at its zenith in 
1987, spending between $750-800 million annually: $300 million in economic aid, and 
between $450-500 in military aid. Economic aid was especially important because it 
included almost all of Nicaragua’s petroleum imports. 78 The efforts to isolate Nicaragua 
from international economic intercourse essentially drove the Sandinistas into 
dependence on Soviet, Cuban, and Eastern European aid for economic survival.79
The Nicaraguan government instituted a “rear-guard” economy, meaning that 
money budgeted by the government went almost exclusively to the military instead of 
education, healthcare, and other essential social services.
  
80
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 The cost of the war was 
shouldered by the urban sector because the countryside was ravaged by the Contras, and 
the agrarian economy was all but halted by the rebellion. Farmers displaced by Contra 
attacks fled to the cities. The U.S.-financed war resulted in the collapse of the forestry, 
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fishing, and mining sectors and decimated agrarian industries, especially the coffee 
industry.81
U.S. Special Forces corroborate that the focus of Contra attacks was principally 
economic targets such as oil fields and local farms. CIA director William Casey wanted 
to “make the bastards sweat.”
 
82 The goal of the CIA and Contra forces was to attack vital 
economic installations, the mission being to “sabotage ports, refineries, boats and 
bridges…and especially difficult sabotage operations were carried out by U.S. Navy 
Seals.”83 The U.S. played an important part in these sabotage campaigns, but made every 
effort to cover its tracks by pinning these actions on the Contras, keeping connections 
with the U.S. out of the conversation as much as possible.84
The mining of port cities outraged world opinion, and further condemnation of the 
Reagan activities in Nicaragua ensued. In fact, it angered U.S. policy makers as well. For 
example, Republican Senator, Barry Goldwater, typically supportive of Reagan, was 
quoted saying on March 5, 1985: “This is no way to run a railroad. I am pissed off!”
 The CIA supposedly does not 
act on its own. It takes orders from the executive branch of government and does not 
make policy autonomously. Did Reagan know what the CIA was doing? Possibly. 
However there is no concrete proof that he did. 
85
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Reagan was frustrated with the revelation of the harbor mining as well as Goldwater’s 
public outcry. Reagan wrote in his diary: “He [Goldwater] is raising hell…because of the 
harbor mining… [He] says he was never briefed. He was briefed on March 8 & 13. There 
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is a rebellion which will lead to their shutting aid off to the Nicaraguan Contras.”86 
Oftentimes Contra leadership had no role to play in these actions. Contra leader Edgar 
Chamorro said this: “Of course, we played no role in the mining of the harbors. This was 
not unusual. The CIA often gave us credit (or perhaps blame) for operations that we knew 
nothing about.”87
The Contra forces were successful in one thing: they damaged the economy and 
standard of living in Nicaragua by attacking the social and economic infrastructure of the 
country. The Contras continued their fight against domestic targets. For example, in 1985 
alone, 55 health centers, three children’s nutritional centers, two electrical plants, and 44 
schools (not including 502 that were damaged) were destroyed. 
 
88 By the beginning of 
1986, war casualties on both sides amounted 31,290 and there were 120,324 people 
displaced. From 1980 to 1987, Nicaragua claimed nearly $1.5 billion in war-induced 
damages to infrastructure and production.89 An entire generation of Nicaraguan youth 
was damaged beyond repair because their education was halted and men were drafted to 
fight. War led to the scarcity of labor, a decline in production, the breakdown of local 
trade, a decline of 50 percent in real wages, and a huge urban migration from the 
countryside to the major industrial cities.90
In 1987 inflation exceeded 1,000 percent and per capita foreign debt was the 
highest in Latin America: growing to $7 billion from $1.5 billion when the FSLN took 
power.
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over 25 percent and from 1980 through 1987, there had been nearly $1.15 billion in war-
induced damages to infrastructure and production in Nicaragua.92 By 1988, Nicaragua 
was in a severe recession and the economy contracted by 15 percent and inflation was on 
the steady increase.93 In fact, that year hyper-inflation of 33,000 percent had set in. This 
forced the government to curtail its revolutionary social programs and adopt a series of 
severe austerity measures to address the fiscal and balance-of-payments crises.94
 The blocking of bilateral and multilateral assistance was constructed by the U.S. 
government in the attempt to provoke domestic dissent and an eventual overthrow of the 
Sandinista regime. The Administration hoped to coerce the people of Nicaragua to call 
for a change in government leadership, understanding that continued U.S. pressure would 
weaken the Nicaraguan economy and the standard of living of its citizens. U.S. officials 
and the President, according to a British Foreign Office official, used “typical of bully-
boy tactics which the present U.S. Administration is apt to adopt –towards allies as well 
as adversaries” with there actions in Nicaragua, especially with economic sanctions.
 
95
U.S. pressure and sanctions strapped Nicaragua, and it was nearly impossible for 
the country to develop a sustainable economy.  President Reagan may have failed to 
overthrow the government through a military means, but his “freedom fighter” Contras 
successfully facilitated an economic collapse of Nicaragua.
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attacks on domestic targets and the U.S.-based sanctions and embargo were too much for 
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the people of Nicaragua to handle. A majority of scholarly opinion holds that economic 
sanctions are an ineffective foreign policy tool. Unlike other attempts of the U.S. to 
destabilize governments around the world, however, economic sanctions in Latin 
America have been more successful.97
Nicaragua was not the only focus of Reagan Doctrine in the world. Similar 
policies formed the Administration’s global strategy. While the Administration had its 
hands tied in Nicaragua, it sponsored and participated in similar actions in Afghanistan, 
Libya, and Lebanon among other nations.
 A primary case in point is that of Nicaragua. 
98 Reagan was supporting insurgencies all over 
the globe to harass the USSR, forcing the communists to spend millions and millions of 
dollars in economic aid to socialist allies. For example, by the mid 1980s, annual 
appropriations for covert support of the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan in its war against the 
Soviets reached $650 million. The costs incurred by the USSR contributed to their 
eventual defeat. The Administration moderately supported the UNITA (National Union 
for the Total Liberation of Angola) rebels who were fighting the Cubans and Angolan 
government troops in Angola, and provided aid to the non-communist resistance against 
the Soviet-influenced People’s Republic of Kampuchea in Cambodia.99
                                               
97 Leogrande, 329. 
 Historians agree 
that Reagan found the most success in Afghanistan, as the Mujahedeen were eventually 
successful in pushing the USSR out of the country. Their long, bitter war devastated and 
drained Soviet resources. 
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 When Reagan left office after his second term as President in January of 1989, the 
Sandinistas and President Ortega were still in power. A majority of Contra guerrilla 
forces had retreated back to Honduran base camps, and the Sandinistas were on the 
diplomatic offensive to “achieve a regional accord for their definitive demobilization.”100 
In February 25, 1990, when Ortega was defeated in the elections, President George H.W. 
Bush would be the Commander-in-Chief. However, it was not Reagan or Bush who 
ultimately negotiated peace between Nicaragua and the Contras or orchestrated the 
victory of Violeta Chamorro. The peace initiative sponsored by Costa Rican President 
Oscar Arias led to a ceasefire in 1988.101 It was primarily the efforts of Arias and the 
Democrats in Congress who mediated the political transition and organization of free 
elections.102 Reagan had the opportunity to join Arias in support for the peace plan, but 
rejected the offer. He wrote in his diary a year before the peace accords in June of 1987, 
saying: “[Arias] has a peace proposal he wants to make on behalf of his Central 
American neighbors & to us to the Sandinistas. We’re in favor of his idea…but his plan 
has some loop holes the Sandinistas could take advantage of.”103 Reagan was clearly 
frustrated that he was no longer involved in the peace process. Plans that he had were 
scrapped and he was accused of impeding the process of peace. In his diary he wrote in 
response: “Speaker Wright has deserted his & our agreement on how to make peace in 
Nicaragua & charges us with being guilty of breaking up the peace efforts. Lies. Lies. 
Lies.”104
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Reagan Doctrine foreign policy in Nicaragua was complex and measuring its 
success or lack thereof is difficult to do. It failed in many ways: military action was 
unsuccessful and diplomatic pressure by the Administration and the lack of positive 
world opinion did not help Reagan and his policies. Economic sanctions, the trade 
embargo, and Contra attacks on domestic targets, did, however, lead to eventual 
government change in Nicaragua. Also, at the same time, military action and economic 
constraints caused the USSR and Cuba to squander precious resources on Nicaragua, 
which may have been Reagan’s plan all along. 
The Contra war was problematic from the beginning. They rarely saw success on 
the battlefield, and the people of Nicaragua rejected the campaign and battle cries against 
the government. Partially due to the financial support of the Soviet Union, the FSLN and 
the national military were never legitimately threatened by the rebel forces. The loss of 
life due to this useless war was tragic. More than 30,000 Nicaraguans, comprised of 
combatants and citizens, were killed needlessly. In addition, by 1988 there were well over 
100,000 refugees. These statistics alone justify condemning the Reagan Doctrine as 
disastrous and devastating to Nicaraguans. Reagan failed to get any significant domestic 
or international support for his actions in Nicaragua and was criticized and condemned in 
the international political arena. The Administration argued that Nicaragua was working 
closely with Cuba and the USSR, and that the presence of a communist nation on the 
North American continent was a grave danger to the national security of the U.S.105
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 The 
FSLN instead desired nothing more than to improve the conditions in their country. There 
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is no evidence that Ortega desired to conspire against the U.S.  Reagan, therefore, had no 
need to spend time supporting and facilitating the rebellion effort in Nicaragua. The 
USSR and Cuba began to aid Nicaragua only after Reagan had began to choke out the 
economy, leaving Ortega no choice but to look elsewhere for help. 
The unrelenting U.S. destabilization campaign and devastating economic 
sanctions and embargo imposed by Reagan embittered most of the Nicaraguan population 
against the Sandinistas. They were not unhappy with the government itself, but with how 
the government had mismanaged the economy. Also, the declined standard of living 
occurred because fending off the Contras was consuming 60 percent of the national 
budget. Due to the U.S. economic stranglehold, the people were looking for a change.106 
The FSLN was forced to choose between implementing a form of wartime communism 
or negotiating a way out. Believing they could win the elections, finally defeat the 
Contras, and stabilize the economy, they chose to allow elections.107 International 
observers saw the Sandinistas defeated in one of the most closely scrutinized elections in 
world history.108 The people of Nicaragua decided that they had had enough of the 
Sandinistas in power, and were unwilling to allow the government to keep fighting while 
the country continued to suffer. The vote in 1990 was not pro-Contra, but it was pro-
change.109
The case study of Reagan foreign policy in Nicaragua is complicated, perplexing, 
and compelling. The superpower nation meddled in a Third World country the size of 
North Carolina and was struggling to achieve its goals. Despite the U.S. being vastly 
 
                                               
106 Jentleson, 67. 
107 Bendaña, 24. 
108 Robinson, 103. 
109 Jentleson, 67. 
 31 
superior, it took a decade to get the socialist government out of power. The events 
sparked international attention to the U.S. exploitation and manipulation in Latin 
America, and even inspired groups like U2 and their famous rock anthem, “Bullet the 
Blue Sky” in the entertainment industry to bring attention to the issues. 110
The funding and support of the Contras was unsuccessful. The movers and 
shakers who negotiated peace and organized free elections did not reside in the White 
House. What facilitated the collapse of the FSLN? Essentially, it was the U.S. economic 
sanctions and trade embargo. Reagan’s legacy in Latin and Central America is tarnished 
at best. His foreign policy was disastrous. The Administration was exposed for corruption 
with the revelations of the Iran-Contra Affair and the CIA involvement in terrorist-like 
acts in Nicaragua. Reagan’s power and influence diminished rapidly as his second term 
came to a conclusion. Like many historians have said, Reagan’s claim to credit for 
Nicaraguan political change is at best “limited,” for it was weakened by the costs it 
incurred and the opportunities foregone.
  
111
Nicaragua was but one piece to Reagan’s global foreign policy strategy. It is 
important to note, that while the Reagan Administration was intervening in Nicaragua, it 
also manipulated eventst elsewhere in the world. Nicaragua was not the only victim to 
Reagan’s aggressive policies. Countries such as Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Angola 
were infiltrated by U.S.-sponsored military insurgencies and suffered from U.S. 
economic policies. Though it can be argued that Reagan’s intervention in the Third 
World was essential in bringing down the USSR two years later, many people suffered 
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the consequences of Reagan Doctrine. Nicaragua is an important case study of how 
effective and ineffective Reagan’s policies were in the Third World.   
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